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NOTE
ABORTION: State Regulations - Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
-, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
The images have become too frequent on the evening news: activists on
both sides of the issue clashing over the right to an abortion, or lack thereof.
Commentators voice their opinions on this topic that has divided people
unlike any other issue in recent history. The Supreme Court seems unsure
and even contradictory in its abortion decisions since it granted this "funda-
mental right" in Roe v. Wade.1 Since that decision, which created what
many have articulated as an unbridled right to the procedure, state legisla-
tures have implemented, and the Supreme Court has upheld, statutes that
regulate a woman's right to an abortion. What is the proper degree of gov-
ernmental regulation over a woman's abortion decision? In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,2 the Supreme Court was presented with an opportu-
nity to clarify the constitutional standard regarding state regulations on
abortion.
This Note contains a synopsis of the facts, procedural history, and back-
ground against which Casey was decided. An evaluation of Casey's multi-
ple opinions will follow. In analyzing the plurality's joint opinion,3 this
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), aff'd in part, overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
2. 505 U.S. - 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The purpose of this Note is not to argue whether
abortion is or is not a constitutionally protected right, but rather to analyze the opinion in Casey,
given that the current Court finds a constitutional right to an abortion. The analysis will primar-
ily focus on the past precedent the Court purported to adhere to, as well as the new "undue
burden" standard the Court enunciated for analyzing the constitutionality of state regulation of
abortion. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. One aspect of the opinion that is likely to
be criticized is the Court's reliance on stare decisis to uphold the essential holding of Roe while
overruling the trimester scheme that Roe established. See infra notes 19, 57 and accompanying
text. For insight into the role of precedent in our legal system, see PRECEDENT IN LAW (Lau-
rence Goldstein ed., 1987); Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401 (1988); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66
N.C. L. REv. 367 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1988); James W. Moore & Robert S. Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare
Decisis and Law of the Case, 21 TEx. L. REv. 514 (1943); Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?,
10 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1941).
3. The plurality opinion was written jointly by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. The
opinion enunciated an "undue burden" standard for analyzing state legislative regulations on
abortion before viability. Justices Stevens and Blackmun concurred in the plurality's judgment
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Note will question and criticize its analysis and propose alternative ap-
proaches the Court could have employed.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Planned Parenthood v. Casey4 involved challenges to five provisions of
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 as amended in 1988 and
1989.' First, Section 3205 required a woman to give her informed consent
to an abortion after receiving specified information at least twenty-four
hours before the procedure was to be performed. 6 Second, Section 3206
required a minor seeking an abortion to give her informed consent, and to
obtain the informed consent of at least one of her parents. In addition,
Section 3206 provided a judicial bypass procedure.7 Third, Section 3209
provided that in the absence of certain exceptions, a married woman seek-
ing an abortion was required to sign a statement indicating that her hus-
band had been notified of her intent.' Fourth, Section 3203 provided a
that the essential holding of Roe, which recognized a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy
before viability, should be reaffirmed. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2838, 2844.
4. 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
5. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3203-3220 (1990). The petitioners were five abortion
clinics and a class of physicians. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2796.
6. The joint opinion summarized Section 3205 as follows:
Except in a medical emergency, the statute requires that at least 24 hours before perform-
ing an abortion a physician inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health
risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the "probable gestational age of the unborn
child." The physician or a qualified nonphysician must inform the woman of the availabil-
ity of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus and providing informa-
tion about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the
father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to
abortion. An abortion may not be performed unless the woman certifies in writing that she
has been informed of the availability of these printed materials and has been provided them
if she chooses to view them.
Casey, 505 U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2822-23 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205).
7. The joint opinion summarized Section 3206 as follows:
Except in a medical emergency, an unemancipated young woman under 18 may not obtain
an abortion unless she and one of her parents (or guardian) provides informed consent as
defined above. If neither a parent nor a guardian provides consent, a court may authorize
the performance of an abortion upon a determination that the young woman is mature and
capable of giving informed consent and has in fact given her informed consent, or that an
abortion would be in her best interests.
Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2832.
8. The joint opinion summarized Section 3209 as follows:
[E]xcept in cases of medical emergency .... no physician shall perform an abortion on a
married woman without receiving a signed statement from the woman that she has notified
her spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion. The woman has the option of provid-
ing an alternative signed statement certifying that her husband is not the man who impreg-
nated her; that her husband could not be located; that the pregnancy is the result of
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definition of "medical emergency" that would excuse compliance with the
requirements of the previous three sections.9 Finally, Sections 3207(b),
3214(a), and 3214(f) imposed various reporting requirements on physicians
and facilities where abortions were performed.'" The district court held all
of the sections unconstitutional, with the exception of minimal parts of Sec-
tion 3214(a).1 1 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed
in part, holding only Section 3209's spousal notification provision unconsti-
tutional. 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 3 and affirmed the Third
Circuit's judgment with respect to all but its holding as to the reporting
requirement of Section 3214(a)(12). 4
spousal sexual assault which she has reported; or that the woman believes that notifying
her husband will cause him or someone else to inflict bodily injury upon her. A physician
who performs an abortion on a married woman without receiving the appropriate signed
statement will have his or her license revoked, and is liable to the husband for damages.
Id. at ._ 112 S. Ct. at 2826 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209).
9. "Medical emergency" was defined as follows:
That condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so com-
plicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abor-
tion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of
substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203.
10. The joint opinion summarized Sections 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(0 as follows:
Under the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the statute, every facility which
performs abortions is required to fie a report stating its name and address as well as the
name and address of any related entity, such as a controlling or subsidiary organization.
In the case of state-funded institutions, the information becomes public.
For each abortion performed, a report must be filed identifying: the physician (and the
second physician where required); the facility; the referring physician or agency; the wo-
man's age; the number of prior pregnancies and prior abortions she has had; gestational
age; the type of abortion procedure; the date of the abortion; whether there were any pre-
existing medical conditions which would complicate pregnancy; medical complications
with the abortion; where applicable, the basis for the determination that the abortion was
medically necessary; the weight of the aborted fetus; and whether the woman was married,
and if so, whether notice was provided [to her husband] or the basis for the failure to give
notice [to her husband]. Every abortion facility must also file quarterly reports showing
the number of abortions performed broken down by trimester. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 3207, 3214 (1990). In all events, the identity of each woman who has had an abortion
remains confidential.
Casey, 505 U.S. at _ 112 S. Ct. at 2832 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), (f)).
11. Id. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2803 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1396
(E.D. Pa. 1990)).
12. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 687 (3d Cir. 1991)).
13. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 502 U.S. _ 112 S. Ct. 931 (1992).
14. Section 3214(a)(12) required women who failed to notify their husbands as required
under Section 3209 to provide their reasons for such failure. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3214(a)(12).
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
Roe v. Wade 11 is the landmark Supreme Court case that granted women
a constitutionally protected right to privacy "broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."16 This right
to privacy is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" In Roe, the Court did not tender an abso-
lute right to obtain an abortion. To the contrary, Roe held that two impor-
tant state interests qualified this right-maternal health and prenatal life. 8
Thus, Roe developed an elaborate trimester scheme to balance state inter-
ests in maternal health and prenatal life against a woman's right to an abor-
tion. 19 At the time, Roe purported to create a right to abortion free from
state interference during the first trimester.20 Subsequent case law, how-
ever, seemed to defy Roe's literal holding, adopting a more flexible ap-
proach to abortion. 2' As a result, state regulations on abortion have
increased since Roe and are generally allowed throughout a woman's preg-
nancy in varying degrees. The following discussion lays a foundation for
the regulations specifically challenged in Casey.
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), aff'd in part, overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court found this privacy right in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, although the Court recognized past
decisions which have found a right to privacy in the First Amendment, the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, and the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 152-53.
17. The Due Process Clause provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Roe, 410 U.S. at 148-52, 154-55.
19. The trimester scheme established:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attend-
ing physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in
promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potenti-
ality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it
is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother.
Id. at 164-65. The trimester scheme has often been criticized and was overruled in Casey, 505
U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2818. For insight as to the criticisms of Roe's trimester scheme, see
Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial Experience with the 1980's
"'Reasonableness" Test, 76 VA. L. REv. 519 (1990).
20. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 19, at 522.
21. See id. at 520; see also Walter Dellinger & Gene Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme
Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83 (1989).
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A. Informed Consent and Mandatory Waiting Periods
An informed consent provision was upheld in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth.22 In Danforth, the Court reasoned as follows:
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful
one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full
knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is the one
primarily concerned, and her awareness of the decision and its sig-
nificance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent
of requiring her prior written consent.23
It appears that Danforth's reasoning was based on a state's interest in ma-
ternal health. Danforth defined informed consent as "the giving of informa-
tion to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its
consequences."' 24 Thus, an informed consent provision was justified during
the first trimester of pregnancy despite the apparent contrary holding in
Roe.25
Informed consent provisions were again considered in City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.26 The Court stated that the
validity of informed consent provisions "rests on the State's interest in pro-
tecting the health of the pregnant woman."'27 Akron invalidated those pro-
visions "designed to influence the woman's informed choice between
abortion or childbrith" since they did not further the states interest in ma-
ternal health.28 Specifically, those provisions informing a woman about
when life begins, 29 those requiring a graphically detailed description of the
fetus,"0 and those describing the abortion procedure as a complex medical
procedure31 were invalidated for not furthering a pregnant woman's in-
formed and thoughtful decision.
22. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The informed consent provision required that a woman, "prior to
submitting to abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, ... certifTfy] in writing that she
consents to the procedure and 'that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the result
of coercion.'" Id. at 58 (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 67.
24. Id. at 67 n.8.
25. See supra note 19.
26. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992).
27. Akron, 462 U.S. at 443.
28. Id. at 444. This conclusion was easily derived because Akron reaffirmed Roe in that states
may not regulate abortions during the first trimester. See id. at 434, 444-45.
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. The Court found particularly objectionable the fact that the description of the unborn
child's characteristics "must include, but not be limited to, 'appearance, mobility, tactile sensitiv-
ity, including pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, the presence of internal
organs and the presence of external members."' Id. at 444 n.34 (citation omitted).
31. Physicians were required to state:
19921
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In addition to the informed consent provisions, Akron considered the
constitutionality of a mandatory waiting period that required women to
wait twenty-four hours after signing an informed consent form before an
abortion could be performed. 32  Despite a lower court's reasoning that a
mandatory waiting period may result in a more careful decision,33 Akron
held that no legitimate state interest was furthered by an "arbitrary and
inflexible waiting period."34
The precedent set forth in Akron was followed in Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.35 Thornburgh broadly recog-
nized that states may not enact legislation "under the guise of protecting
maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing
pregnancies." 36 A specific provision requiring women to give their in-
formed consent upon the receipt of printed materials available from the
state was declared unconstitutional. 37 The printed materials described the
fetus at two-week intervals. Utilizing the same reasoning as in Akron,38
Thornburgh noted that fetal descriptions are irrelevant to a woman's deci-
sionmaking process and may actually serve to confuse and punish her.39
[A]bortion is a major surgical procedure which can result in serious complications, includ-
ing hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscar-
riage and prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave essentially
unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological problems she may have, and can
result in severe emotional disturbances.
Id. at 445 n.36 (citation omitted). To the contrary, in Akron, the Court regarded an abortion as a
"minor surgical procedure." Id. at 444 n.35 (quoting Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. City of
Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1203 (E.D. Ohio 1979)).
32. Akron, 462 U.S. at 449.
33. Id. at 449-50 (citing Akron, 479 F. Supp. at 1204).
34. Id. at 450. The Court accepted the district court's findings that the waiting period in-
creased the cost of obtaining an abortion by requiring two separate trips to the abortion facility, as
well as the fact that scheduling difficulties between the pregnant woman and physician may effec-
tively cause a greater delay, thereby aggravating the risks of an abortion in some cases. See id. at
450 (citing Akron, 479 F. Supp. at 1204)); cf. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), where a
two-parent notification requirement with a judicial bypass option was declared constitutional.
Hodgson reached this conclusion despite findings of the district court that delays of more than a
week would result should a minor desire a judicial proceeding. Id. at 442 (citing Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 764-65 (D. Minn. 1986)).
35. 476 U.S. 747, 760-63 (1986), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -,
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992).
36. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759 (emphasis added). This holding would appear to be slightly
narrower then that of Akron where the word "persuade" was used. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
37. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762. The Court stated that these printed materials were plainly
overinclusive no matter how objective they may be. Id.
38. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
39. Furthermore, the information may serve only "to heighten her anxiety, contrary to ac-
cepted medical practice." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762.
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In reviewing the Court's decisions regarding informed consent provi-
sions, two main points emerged. First, the Court would likely find in-
formed consent provisions designed to influence a woman from choosing an
abortion unconstitutional since this type of information did not further a
state's maternal health interest. Second, the rigid trimester scheme de-
clared in Roe appeared to exist in theory only, as a state's interest in mater-
nal health justified informed consent provisions throughout a woman's
gestation period.
B. Parental Consent
In a concurring opinion in Danforth, Justice Stewart stated the purpose
for involving a minor's parents in their daughter's abortion decision:
There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally
permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to
seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important
decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and
a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to
make it without mature advice and emotional support.4
Despite this rationale, Danforth held a provision that required parental con-
sent unconstitutional. 41 The Court stated, "[T]he State may not impose a
blanket provision... requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco
parentis as a condition for abortion for an unmarried minor during the first
12 weeks of pregnancy."'42 The Court reached this conclusion although it
acknowledged that there may be significant state interests for requiring
parental consent, such as safeguarding the family unit and parental
authority. 43
40. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976).
41. The parental consent provision stated that no abortion could be performed during the
first 12 weeks of pregnancy without "the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis
of the woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion
is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother." Id. at
85 (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 74; see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992)
(blanket determination that all minors under the age of 15 are too immature to make an abortion
decision or that an abortion may never be in the minor's best interests without parental approval
was unconstitutional).
43. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. The Court was not persuaded that a strengthening of the family
unit would occur from absolute parental power to overrule a daughter's decision to terminate a
pregnancy. Nor did the Court recognize that parental authority would be enhanced when a minor
and her parent(s) were in such conflict. Id.
1992]
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Thus, in Bellotti v. Baird,' the Court stated, "[I]f the State decides to
require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abor-
tion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization
for the abortion can be obtained."4 At this alternative proceeding, a minor
would obtain authorization for the procedure provided she could show
either that she is sufficiently mature and informed to make a decision of this
nature or that an abortion would be in her best interests.46
C. Spousal Notification
Roe declined to consider a father's constitutional rights, if any, with
respect to an abortion decision 7.4  However, in Danforth, a provision requir-
ing a husband's consent48 before an abortion could be performed during the
first trimester was ruled unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that since
Roe did not allow a state to regulate or proscribe abortion during the first
trimester, a state should not be allowed to "delegate" this veto power to a
spouse.49 Although the Court recognized a husband's concern for his wife's
pregnancy and the fetus she is carrying, it stated that any disagreement over
the abortion decision must be decided by the woman "as it is [she] who
physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately
affected by the pregnancy. '50
D. "Medical Emergency"
The purpose for a medical emergency definition is to excuse compliance
with state abortion regulations if the mother's health is in such danger that
an immediate abortion is necessary. Roe held that a state may not prohibit
44. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
45. Id. at 643 (footnote omitted). This is commonly referred to as a judicial bypass proce-
dure. The Court stated that this "alternative procedure" could involve a determination by a judi-
cial proceeding or an administrative agency. Id. n.22. In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417
(1990), the Court, under a similar rationale, held unconstitutional a two parent notice requirement
that did not have a judicial bypass option; cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (no judicial
bypass option necessary when the Court found constitutional a parental notice statute since par-
ents could not exercise an absolute veto over their daughter's abortion decision).
46. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44; see also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 416
(1990); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (Court upheld parental con-
sent provisions containing judicial bypass procedures under similar reasoning).
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973), aff'd in part, overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
48. It should be noted that the joint opinion in Casey relies heavily on the spousal consent
provision considered in Danforth. See infra notes 80, 139-42 and accompanying text. However,
the issue in Casey concerned spousal notice, not consent.
49. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69 (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 71.
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abortions "necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."5 Thus,
it appears from Roe that any regulation which delays or prevents an abor-
tion must also contain an exception in case of a medical emergency.5 2
E. Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements
In Danforth, the constitutionality of requiring health facilities and phy-
sicians to keep records and statistics relating to abortions performed under
their care was considered and upheld. 3 Although the information to be
recorded was never clearly articulated, the Court held that maternal health
was furthered through proper utilization of this information since medical
knowledge, experience, and judgment would be advanced. 4 Thus, the
Court stated that "[r]ecordkeeping and reporting requirements that are rea-
sonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly
respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible."5 5
III. EVALUATION OF THE CASE
A. The Joint Opinion
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 6 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter expressly overruled the rigid trimester scheme of Roe" and enunci-
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. In Roe, this statement referred to the time after fetal viability.
However, the inference is permitted that the statement applies before viability as well. See Roe,
410 U.S. at 162-64; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2822; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 316 (1980).
52. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 699 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, overruled in
part, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2833 (1992). At the time of Thornburgh's ruling, an almost
identical definition of medical emergency was defined as:
That condition which, on the basis of the physician's best clinical judgment, so complicates
a pregnancy as to necessitate the immediate abortion of same to avert the death of the
mother or for which a 24-hour delay will create grave peril of immediate and irreversible
loss of major bodily function.
18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1983). Although this definition was not challenged in Thorn-
burgh, the Court cited it with approval: "It is clear that the Pennsylvania Legislature knows how
to provide a medical-emergency exception when it chooses to do so." Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 771 (1986), overruled in part, Casey, 505
U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
53. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79-80.
54. Id. at 81.
55. Id. at 80; cf. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765-68 (reporting requirements invalidated due to
the scope of information required and its availability to the public).
56. 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
57. Id. at__, 112 S. Ct. at 2818. Overruling the trimester scheme seems somewhat contradic-
tory. The joint opinion upheld the essential holding of Roe, underscoring the obligation to adhere
to precedent out of necessity. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2808. The joint opinion cautioned against
frequent overruling, noting that Roe has not been proven to be "unworkable," id. at -, 112 S. Ct.
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ated an "undue burden" standard5" for testing the constitutionality of all
state regulations on abortion before fetal viability. Specifically, a regulation
will amount to an undue burden when:
[A] state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means cho-
sen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calcu-
lated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a statute
which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other
valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible
means of serving its legitimate ends. 9
The "undue burden" standard recognizes that before viability a state's in-
terest in the potential life of a fetus is not strong enough to support a prohi-
bition of abortion.60
Utilizing the "undue burden" standard, the joint opinion upheld the in-
formed consent and twenty-four hour waiting period provisions of Section
at 2809 (citation omitted), and that a repudiation of Roe would negatively affect those who have
relied on Roe's continued application. Id. Moreover, a "decision to overrule Roe's essential hold-
ing ... [would cause] profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the
Nation's commitment to the rule of law." Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2816.
The joint opinion, however, reaffirmed three aspects of Roe's holding:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability, the
State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposi-
tion of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure. Second
is a confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law
contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger a woman's life or health. And third is
the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
These principles do not contradict one another; and we adhere to each.
Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
58. The "undue burden" standard is not completely new to the Supreme Court. For past
cases utilizing the phrase, see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S.
405 (1990) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828-29 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 461-66 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled in part,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992) (undue burden found in
situations involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438, 446 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976).
59. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
60. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2804. However, implicit in this statement is a recognition that a
state's interest in potential life exists throughout a pregnancy. See id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2820-2 1.
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3205.61 Moreover, the joint opinion overruled Akron and Thornburgh to
the extent that "truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of
the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the
'probable gestational age' of the fetus"62 was constitutional, even if persua-
sive to a woman regarding her abortion decision.
The joint opinion held that informing women of the availability of
materials relating to the consequences to the fetus as a result of an abortion
was constitutional and was supported by both the state's interest in mater-
nal health as well as its interest in potential life.6 3 The opinion noted that a
state's interest in maternal health required fully informed consent and that
most women would consider this information relevant to their decisionmak-
ing process." Furthermore, the opinion argued that the state's interest in
protecting the potential life of the unborn "is a reasonable measure to insure
an informed choice."6
Included in Pennsylvania's informed consent statute was the require-
ment that women seeking abortions wait twenty-four hours after giving
their informed consent.66 The joint opinion's analysis of the waiting period
was two-fold. First, on a theoretical level, the opinion acknowledged that a
mandatory waiting period would allow time for a woman to reflect on the
information she had been required to receive. Therefore, the waiting period
was reasonably related to a state's interest in protecting the potential life of
a fetus.67 Second, on a practical level, the opinion rejected arguments that a
waiting period amounted to a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion.68 Thus, the waiting period did not amount to an "un-
due burden."
61. See id. at -., 112 S. Ct. at 2822-26.
62. Id. at _ 112 S. Ct. at 2823. The Court justified this statement by recognizing a state's
important interest in potential life and maternal health. Id.
63. See id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2823-24. This particular information was not mandatorily
presented to women. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(2)(i) (1990).
64. See Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2823-24. Note that this statement is no different
than precedent. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976); see also supra note
23 and accompanying text.
65. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
66. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205.
67. Casey, 505 U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
68. The district court made the following findings of fact regarding the effect of the waiting
period:
[B]ecause of the distances many women must travel to reach an abortion provider, the
practical effect will often be a delay of much more than a day because the waiting period
requires that a woman seeking an abortion make at least two visits to the doctor.... [I]n
many instances this will increase the exposure of women seeking abortion to "the harass-
ment and hostility of anti-abortion protestors demonstrating outside a clinic."
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The joint opinion also upheld the parental consent provision of Section
3209.69 Relying on precedent,7" the opinion held that a state may require
parental (or guardian) consent for minors seeking an abortion, provided an
adequate judicial bypass procedure existed.71 The petitioners argued that
parental consent provisions were unconstitutional since they required in-
formed parental consent. The joint opinion, however, disposed of this argu-
ment using the same rationale set forth in its analysis of Section 3205's
informed consent provision.72
The spousal notification requirement of Section 3209 was declared un-
constitutional. 73 The joint opinion's analysis was two-fold. First, it con-
cluded that the statute would have the effect of preventing a significant
number of women from obtaining an abortion, thus imposing a substantial
obstacle and undue burden.7 4 The opinion found particularly troublesome
the physical and psychological abuse that some women would be subjected
to by their respective spouses upon notification.75  In making this determi-
nation, the joint opinion relied on the district court's findings, 76 as sup-
ported by a plethora of studies, statistics, and literature.77 The opinion
acknowledged that Section 3209 may affect only a small percentage of wo-
men.78 Nevertheless, it stated that "[t]he proper focus of constitutional in-
Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1351 (E.D.
Pa. 1990)).
69. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2832-33.
70. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2832.
72. Id.; see supra notes 61-65.
73. See Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-31.
74. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
75. Id.
76. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-27.
77. The joint opinion found particularly troublesome the fact that the spousal notification
provision contained a bodily injury exception that would only apply to women having reasonable
fears of physical abuse upon themselves. The opinion stated:
[Women] may have a reasonable fear that notifying their husbands will provoke further
instances of child abuse; these women are not exempt from § 3209's notification require-
ment. Many may fear devastating forms of psychological abuse from their husbands, in-
cluding verbal harassment, threats of future violence, the destruction of possessions,
physical confinement to the home, the withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of
the abortion to family and friends. These methods of psychological abuse may act as even
more of a deterrent to notification than the possibility of physical violence, but women who
are the victims of the abuse are not exempt from § 3209's notification requirement.
Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
78. The joint opinion did not take issue with the respondents' argument that only 20% of all
abortions are attributable to married women, and of those women, typically about 95% would
notify their husbands. Thus, the respondents concluded that the spousal notification provision
would affect one percent of women seeking abortions. See id.
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quiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom
the law is irrelevant. 79
The second phase of the joint opinion's analysis determined, despite the
troublesome effects of possible abuse, whether a husband's interest in the
fetus would nevertheless validate the spousal notification requirement. The
opinion concluded that a husband's interest in the fetus his wife was carry-
ing was not as great as the mother's liberty interest in deciding whether to
obtain an abortion. 0 Therefore, the husband's interest in the fetus was not
sufficient to validate the spousal notification provision.81
Casey upheld the definition of medical emergency in Section 3203.2
The petitioners argued that the definition was too narrow because it would
not allow an immediate abortion in light of some significant health risks.8 3
The joint opinion deferred construction of Section 3203 to the court of ap-
peals, which did not construe the statute so narrowly. The Court stated,
"[W]e read the medical emergency exception as intended by the Penn-
sylvania legislature to assure that compliance with its abortion regulations
would not in any way pose a significant threat to the life or health of a
woman."84
The joint opinion applied the standard set forth in Danforth to uphold
most of the reporting and recordkeeping provisions of the Pennsylvania
statute.8 The opinion reasoned that the requirements were reasonably re-
lated to the preservation of maternal health in that they provided beneficial
medical research which utilized actual patient information.86 The opinion
acknowledged that the reporting and recordkeeping requirements may in-
crease the cost of obtaining an abortion. However, due to a lack of factual
79. Id.
80. The joint opinion based its rationale on two factors. First, the opinion realized that a
husband's interest in the child may be equal upon birth. However, before birth, the woman is the
one primarily affected, and state regulation will affect "the very bodily integrity of the pregnant
woman." Id. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2830. The opinion cited Danforth as further support for this
proposition, noting that when spouses disagree on abortion, the balance must weigh in the wife's
favor due to the fact that the woman is "more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy,
as between the two." Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976)); see
also supra notes 48-50. Second, the joint opinion did not want to enable the husband to "wield an
effective veto over his wife's decision." Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2831. To allow this would not
comport with the modem understanding that women have an equal and independent role within
the family. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id at , 112 S. Ct. at 2822.
83. Id. Specifically, the district court found three health risks not covered by the statute:
preeclampsia, inevitable abortion, and premature ruptured membrane. Id. (citation omitted).
84. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 701 (3d Cir. 1991)).
85. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2832-33; see also supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2832-33.
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findings, the opinion could not conclude that such costs placed a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The joint opinion did,
however, invalidate Section 3214(a)(12), which required a woman seeking
an abortion to state her "reason for failure to provide notice" to her hus-
band if she did not provide notice as required under Section 3209.87
B. Stevens's Opinion
Justice Stevens disagreed with the joint opinion's decision regarding the
mandatory waiting period as well as portions of the informed consent provi-
sions. In so doing, Stevens weighed the state's interest in potential life
against the woman's liberty interest in obtaining an abortion. Stevens con-
cluded, like the plurality of the joint opinion, that a state may express a
preference for childbirth."8 However, he seriously criticized attempts to in-
fluence a woman's choice. Relying on precedent, 9 he argued that informa-
tion concerning the availability of printed materials describing the unborn
child, lists of agencies offering alternatives to abortion, and benefits which
accrue to the mother upon birth were particularly offensive and thereby
unconstitutional.9" Stevens recognized that "[d]ecisional autonomy must
limit the state's power to inject into a woman's most personal deliberations
its own view of what is best." 91
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the joint opinion's decision to uphold
the twenty-four hour waiting period. He conceded that a mandatory delay
might decrease the number of abortions performed.92 However, he main-
tained that the state's interest in potential human life could not justify a
delay as a matter of course since any state coercion which decreased the
amount of abortions would then be justified. 93 In addition, Stevens argued
that a state's interest in maternal health could not justify a waiting period
because there was a lack of evidence that a mandatory delay would benefit
87. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(a)(12). The joint opinion stated:
This provision in effect requires women, as a condition of obtaining an abortion, to provide
the Commonwealth with the precise information we have already recognized that many
women have pressing reasons not to reveal. Like the spousal notice requirement itself, this
provision places an undue burden on a woman's choice, and must be invalidated for that
reason.
Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2833.
88. For Justice Stevens, a state may express its views favoring childbirth "by creating and
maintaining alternatives to abortion, and by espousing the virtues of family." Id. at -, 112 S. Ct.
at 2840-41.
89. Justice Stevens cited Thornburgh and Akron. Id.
90. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2841.
91. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2840.
92. See id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2841.
93. Id.
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women in reaching a more informed and thoughtful decision.94 To the con-
trary, Stevens noted that a stigma would be attached to women resting on
"outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about the[ir] decisionmaking
capacity."9
C. Blackmun's Opinion
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the "undue burden" standard and ar-
gued for the application of the strict scrutiny standard96 when analyzing the
constitutionality of abortion regulations. Under this standard, Blackmun
would have invalidated all97 of the Pennsylvania provisions because they
violated a woman's right to privacy. 98
94. Id.
95. Id. at.., 112 S. Ct. at 2841-42.
96. The strict scrutiny standard was applied in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973), aff'd
inpart, overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992).
Questions arise as to whether the "undue burden" test replaced the strict scrutiny standard in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). See, eg., James Bopp, Jr. et al., Does
the United States Supreme Court Have a Constitutional Duty to Expressly Reconsider and Overrule
Roe v. Wade?, 1 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 55, 73-82 (1990); Randall D. Eggert et al., "Of Winks
and Nods"-Webster's Uncertain Effect on Current and Future Abortion Legislation, 55 Mo. L.
REV. 163 (1990); Lynn D. Wardle, "Time Enough": Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and
the Prudent Pace of Justice, 41 FLA. L. REv. 881 (1989). Under the strict scrutiny standard, the
state must demonstrate that the regulation of an abortion "is both necessary and narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest." Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2847 (citing
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)); see alsa Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. Blackmun
noted that strict scrutiny of restrictions on a woman's right to abortion does not mean the right is
absolute. Rather, abortion regulations can be upheld "if they have no significant impact on the
woman's exercise of her right and are justified by important state health objectives." Casey, 505
U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2847 n.5. The strict scrutiny standard is more demanding than the
"undue burden" standard. Under the "undue burden" standard, any valid state interest, as op-
posed to a compelling state interest, may allow regulation of abortions provided it is not a substan-
tial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. See supra text accompanying note 59.
97. Although Blackmun stated that all the challenged provisions would be invalidated under
a strict scrutiny standard, he joined the joint opinion in upholding the medical emergency provi-
sion. Casey, 505 U.S. at _ 112 S. Ct. at 2845. Whether Blackmun is referring to Section 3203,
which defines medical emergency, is therefore unclear.
98. Justice Blackmun first argued that restrictive abortion laws infringe upon a woman's right
to bodily integrity by imposing "substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of physical
harm." Id. at _ 112 S. Ct. at 2846. Moreover, Blackmun argued that abortion regulations
"deprive[ ] a woman of the right to make her own decision about reproduction and family plan-
ning," choices central to the right of privacy. Id. Finally, Blackmun noted that restricting a
woman's right to an abortion implicates constitutional guarantees of gender equality because an
implicit assumption exists that women will be forced to accept their status as a mother. Id. at
112 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (citations omitted).
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Blackmun found parts of Section 3205 to be biased.9 9 Furthermore, he
was persuaded by the district court's findings of fact concerning the twenty-
four hour waiting period,"° and argued it was thereby unconstitutional.
He also took issue with the parental consent provision of Section 3206, stat-
ing that the judicial bypass procedure could not cure a violation that was
unconstitutional to begin with. 0 1 Finally, Blackmun would have invali-
dated all of the reporting requirements because they did not further a state's
interest in maternal health. 102
D. Rehnquist's Opinion10 3
In an opinion joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist disagreed with the joint opinion's "undue burden" standard
and argued that abortion regulations which are rationally related to any
legitimate state interest must be upheld." Under this reasoning, Rehn-
quist would have held all of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania
statute constitutional and rationally related to a legitimate state interest.' 05
99. The printed materials were particularly objectionable to Blackmun in that they "describe
the fetus and provide information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child
support from the father, and a list of agencies ... that provide adoption and other services as
alternatives to abortion." Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2850 (relying heavily on the analysis set forth in
Thornburgh).
100. See supra note 68. Blackmun was also concerned that women would be subject to obvi-
ously slanted information for a longer period of time, thus improperly influencing their decisions.
Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2851-52.
101. Blackmun relied on the district court's finding that in order to comply with this section,
an in-person visit by the parent to the facility would be necessary, thus causing delays of up to
several weeks. See Casey, 505 U.S. at -,112 S. Ct. at 2852 n.10 and accompanying text.
102. One interest the state does further, according to Blackmun, is the public's right to know
how its tax dollars are spent. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2852.
103. The importance of discussing Rehnquist's opinion cannot be understated. In Casey,
Rehnquist boldly stated, "We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be
overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases." Id.
at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2855. Rehnquist only needs concurrence from one more member of the Court,
and as Justice Blackmun stated, "I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and
when I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue
before us today." Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
104. The "rational relation" test is less demanding then the "undue burden" test. Because
Rehnquist believes that the right to abortion is not fundamental, there should not be a stringent
test to determine the constitutionality of abortion regulations. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 467-78 (1977) (laws funding childbirth
but not abortion impinge upon no fundamental right and are rationally related to the legitimate
state interest of protecting potential life).
105. See Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
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The Chief Justice argued that the informed consent provisions were jus-
tified by a state's maternal health interest,"0 6 a state's interest in potential
life, 107 or both. 0 8 Furthermore, Rehnquist stated that the mandatory wait-
ing period was rationally related to both of these state interests because the
added time for reconsideration and reflection would help ensure that a wo-
man's decision to obtain an abortion was fully informed. 0 9
Rehnquist articulated that the constitutionality of the parental consent
provision was based upon a state's "strong and legitimate interest in the
welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of
judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights
wisely."110 Furthermore, the Chief Justice argued that parental consent
provisions were rationally related to this state interest since "in most in-
stances, the family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified minor advice
that is both compassionate and mature." '
Rehnquist stated that the spousal notification requirement was ration-
ally related to two legitimate state interests. First, the state has a legitimate
interest in protecting the concerns of the father, who has an interest in pro-
creation within marriage and the potential life of a child. 1 2 The spousal
notification provision would thus allow husbands to participate in the abor-
tion decision of his wife. 13 Second, the state has a legitimate interest in
promoting marital integrity by improving communication between husband
and wife and encouraging "collaborative decisionmaking."114 Although
106. These provisions required a doctor to disseminate information regarding the abortion
procedure, risks, and alternatives. Rehnquist asserted that these provisions are rationally related
to a state's legitimate interest in assuring that a woman's decision to abort is fully informed. Id. at
- 112 S. Ct. at 2867. It is this author's opinion that this distinction is one of form only since the
reason the state does have an interest in a fully informed abortion decision is to further maternal
health. See id.; Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
760 (1986), overruled in part, Casey, 505 U.S. at -_, 112 S. Ct. at 2823; City of Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 446 (1983), overruled in part, Casey, 505 U.S. at -,
112 S. Ct. at 2823; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976).
107. These provisions included the required disclosure of information regarding the availabil-
ity of child support from the father, as well as state-funded alternatives for women who decide to
carry a child to term. Casey, 505 U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2868.
108. These provisions included information describing the gestational age of the fetus as well
as the risks of carrying a fetus to term. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2867.
109. Id. at_, 112 S. Ct. at 2868.
110. Id. at -' 112 S. Ct. at 2869 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990)).
111. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990)).
112. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2871.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Rehnquist conceded that this provision may be unnecessary at times, he
stated that it did not imply the provision was irrational.11
Rehnquist asserted that the various reporting requirements of the Penn-
sylvania statute were rationally related to a number of legitimate state inter-
ests. These interests included advancing medical knowledge, gathering
statistics on patients, ensuring compliance with other provisions, and in-
forming taxpayers what their tax dollars were servicing and who they
benefited. 116
Finally, the Chief Justice stated that the definition of medical emergency
in Section 3203 was entirely reasonable. Thus, the provision should be up-
held accordingly. 17
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Informed Consent and Mandatory Waiting Periods
The joint opinion recognized that truthful, nonmisleading information is
an important decisionmaking tool for women who are considering whether
to obtain an abortion. 18 In addition, the opinion stated that informed con-
sent provisions were supported by a state's interest in both maternal health
and fetal life.119 The primary flaw in this reasoning, however, is that the
state's interest in fetal life before viability is elevated above that of maternal
health. This is particularly disturbing considering that no Court has ever
held that a state's interest in fetal life should take precedence over maternal
health during the period before viability. 2 The flaw can be coherently ex-
amined by considering the effect of materials that inform a woman consid-
115. Id. at.._, 112 S. Ct. at 2871-72.
116. Id. at..., 112 S. Ct. at 2872.
117. Rehnquist noted the upholding of an almost identical medical emergency definition in
Thornburgh. Id. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2873.
118. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2822-25 (1992).
119. See supra note 63.
120. This is necessarily so because the Supreme Court has never interpreted the Constitution
to recognize a fetus as a human being deserving protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59, 162 (1973), aff'd in part, overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992); Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 n.8 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled
in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 569 n.13 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens even acknowledged that implicit in the joint opinion's analysis
was the notion that a state's interest in maternal health must take precedence over a state's inter-
est in potential human life since the Constitution has never been interpreted as recognizing an
unborn fetus as a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at
2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ering an abortion of the consequences to a nonviable fetus as a result of the
procedure. 121
A woman's abortion decision is often stressful and emotional, 12' and
information describing the effects of abortion on a fetus during this stressful
time may be particularly disturbing to women. These women already know
that an abortion will ultimately result in the end of a potential life. There-
fore, additional information that describes the specific effects on the fetus
may only serve to confuse and punish the woman. 2 3 The joint opinion held
that "a State is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor child-
birth over abortion, even if those measures do not further a health inter-
est,"' 24 as long as they are truthful and nonmisleading. However, by
confusing and punishing women through information relating to the conse-
quences to the fetus, women may suffer detrimental effects upon their physi-
cal, emotional, and mental health. This contradicts a state's competing,
and more important, maternal health interest.1 25 Thus, when analyzing the
constitutionality of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, the
joint opinion appears to allow situations to arise which elevate a state's in-
terest in fetal life above that of maternal health.
As a result, courts interpreting the joint opinion are likely to be con-
fused and uncertain in their decisions.1 26 Information describing the conse-
quences to a fetus can be objectively presented such that it is truthful and
121. The joint opinion referred to Pennsylvania's informed consent provision that required
information regarding "the availability of information relating to fetal development and the assist-
ance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term." Casey, 505 U.S.
-, 112 S. Ct. at 2824. However, the joint opinion also stated that "informed choice need not be
defined in such narrow terms that all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant."
Id. at - 112 S. Ct. at 2823-24. This analysis will focus on the impact of this latter statement.
Therefore, the consequences to a fetus as a result of an abortion could include such information as
the amount of pain the fetus may be subjected to during the procedure. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text; see also Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 782 (7th Cir. 1980) (statute requiring
women to read statements regarding organic pain to fetus as a result of abortion held
unconstitutional).
122. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at _ 112 S. Ct. at
2846 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (restrictive abortion laws force women to endure physical inva-
sions to bodily integrity at a time when women are already exposed to a wide range of health
consequences).
123. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
124. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
125. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
126. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated the uncertainty of abortion jurisprudence as follows:
[T]he state of our post-Roe decisional law dealing with the regulation of abortion is confus-
ing and uncertain, indicating that a reexamination of that line of cases is in order. Unfor-
tunately for those who must apply this Court's decisions, the reexamination undertaken
today leaves the Court no less divided than beforehand.
Casey, 505 U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2855.
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nonmisleading, as the joint opinion required. Nevertheless, the same infor-
mation may have serious implications for the woman and her decision to
abort. Thus, despite possible adverse effects on women, future courts may
be handcuffed by increasingly graphic, but truthful, descriptions about fetal
consequences and will be unable to invalidate them in light of the joint
opinion. 127
In response to this analysis, the Court could have considered an alterna-
tive while still maintaining its holding that truthful, nonmisleading infor-
mation is constitutional. Although a state may require information to be
given to a woman considering an abortion, this information could be strictly
limited to that which has the most direct effect on the woman's body, such
as the medical procedures to be performed upon her and the risks
therein. 121 Information indirectly related to a woman's health, such as fetal
consequences, would not be presented and thus would not be subject to the
interpretation that a state's interest in fetal life before viability is greater
than a state's interest in maternal health. In other words, the woman would
be assured that the state's interest in her health is greater than the state's
interest in the fetus.
The joint opinion's analysis of the twenty-four hour waiting period
presents other difficulties. Under the opinion's practical analysis, 129 the va-
lidity of the waiting period was considered and upheld independently of the
other informed consent provisions. 130 Section 3205 is structured, however,
such that the waiting period is not severable from the remaining informed
consent provisions.1 ' Therefore, the joint opinion should have considered
whether the waiting period, in conjunction with the other informed consent
127. One may argue that Casey's holding applies only to materials that are made available to
women, and not materials that are to be mandatorily presented. See supra note 63 and accompa-
nying text. Since the joint opinion did not address this distinction, it appears that future courts
will be required to apply the "undue burden" test to mandatorily presented information. How-
ever, the Court seemed to suggest that an application of the "undue burden" test would not invali-
date mandatorily presented information relating to fetal consequences. The joint opinion stated
by way of example, "We would think it constitutional for the State to require that in order for
there to be informed consent to a kidney transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with
information about risks to the donor as well as risks to himself or herself." Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at
2823. The very terms of the example indicate that risks to the donor will be mandatorily
presented to the recipient. The same analysis can justify future courts in upholding mandatorily
presented materials that describe the risks and consequences to the fetus as a result of an abortion.
128. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Stevens advocated the constitutionality of
those sections that informed the woman both of the risks of abortion and of carrying a child to
term, since these provisions were neutral in nature. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2841.
129. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
130. See Casey, 505 U.S. at-, 112 S. Ct. at 2825-26; see also supra notes 66-68 and accompa-
nying text.
131. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a) (1990).
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provisions, amounted to an undue burden under its practical analysis.132
This type of analysis is necessary because, although the joint opinion was
meticulous in dissecting the constitutionality of each Pennsylvania provi-
sion at issue, women faced with such a difficult decision are not likely to
employ a similarly thorough evaluation. Moreover, states will be able to
manipulate the "undue burden" standard by creating a variety of regula-
tions that individually do not amount to a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion. 133 In practice, however, quite the opposite
may be true when these same regulations are taken as a whole.1 34
B. Parental Consent
The Supreme Court has been explicit throughout the years in stating
that a parental consent provision is constitutional, provided an adequate
judicial bypass option exists.1 35 The judicial bypass option of Section 3206
allows a minor to obtain an abortion without her parent's consent provided
she can show that she is mature and capable of giving her informed consent
to the abortion procedure, or if a court determines an abortion would be in
the pregnant minor's best interest. 136 However, since Section 3206 requires
informed consent, the same deficiencies exist as were stated in the analysis
of Section 3205's requirement that all women give their informed consent to
obtain an abortion.
1 37
C. Spousal Notification
In striking down the spousal notification provision, the joint opinion is
relying on precedent that does not apply.1 38 To arrive at a conclusion that
the joint opinion found consistent with the precedent established in Dan-
132. See Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2825-26.
133. See iL at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. The Section 3206 parental consent requirement is a good illustration of this point. Pa-
rental consent contains three types of regulations on abortion. First, a parent must consent to the
procedure, provided that the minor does not elect the bypass procedure. Second, the parent and
the minor must give their informed consent to the procedure. Third, the minor is subject to a
waiting period. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (1990). How many regulations can be
placed on a woman's abortion decision before they amount to an undue burden? According to the
joint opinion's analysis, there will be no undue burden if each regulation individually does not
amount to an undue burden.
135. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
136. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (1990).
137. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 48-50, 80; Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2869-70 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 n.17 (1981). The precedent that the joint opin-
ion relied on was boldly stated, "The principles that guided the Court in Danforth should be our
guides today." Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2831.
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forth, the opinion concluded that the findings of fact set forth by the district
court would control a woman's decision to forgo an abortion. 13 9 In actual-
ity, the effect of the joint opinion's analysis in many circumstances would
not amount to an appreciable difference than an analysis under Dan forth.
Specifically, if the woman's perception of her husband's reaction will act to
prevent her choice of abortion, the husband has in effect "wield[ed] an effec-
tive veto over his wife's decision.""4 However, the veto power in Danforth
was found unconstitutional for a different reason. Danforth was concerned
with the husband's reasons, if any, for not consenting to his wife's decision
to choose an abortion. 4 The joint opinion, however, changed the focus of
the constitutional inquiry from the husband's reasons for preventing his
wife's abortion decision to his wife's perceptions of how he may act upon
notification of her abortion decision.
The effect of this change in inquiry shows the limitations of the "undue
burden" standard. In a certain sense, the application of the "undue bur-
den" standard is creating its own undue burden by considering irrelevant
issues. Instead of ending the constitutional inquiry by simply stating that
the husband can not effectuate a woman's decision for her, as in Danforth,
the joint opinion's "undue burden" standard further inquires into the wo-
man's perceptions of possible abuse. This is an irrelevant step under Dan-
forth, which the joint opinion boldly stated to be adhering to.42
Moreover, the joint opinion shifted its inquiry back to the husband by
determining whether the husband's interest in the fetus nevertheless would
validate the spousal notification provision. It is unclear how the "undue
burden" test is meant to operate with respect to the husband's interest in
the potential fetus. The very terms of the "undue burden" standard pre-
clude legitimate state interests from consideration once an undue burden
has been found.143 Thus, any legitimate interest the state may have with
respect to the husband is irrelevant after the spousal notification provision
was held an undue burden. Is this same analysis to be extended when solely
considering the husband's interest in the fetus, independent of any state
interest? If so, the joint opinion's inquiry into the husband's interest in the
fetus would appear to be another irrelevant consideration.
139. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
140. Casey, 505 U.S. at -., 112 S. Ct. at 2831; see also supra note 80.
141. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976); see also supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
142. See supra note 138.
143. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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D. "Medical Emergency"
As stated earlier, Section 3203's definition of medical emergency would
excuse compliance with the other statutory provisions."4 This holding is
consistent with Casey's reaffirmation of Roe's holding which "forbids a
state from interfering with a woman's choice to undergo an abortion proce-
dure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her
health." 14
5
One issue with respect to a statute defining a medical emergency is
whether that statute would be interpreted more narrowly by lower courts,
thus subjecting a woman to state interference if the health risk is not inter-
preted to reach the threshold where the definition would apply. As long as
the definition is broadly construed, there does not appear to be a problem
with such definitions. However, the joint opinion was clear in its analysis
that the interpretation of such statutes will usually be deferred to more local
courts that are better able to interpret the laws of their respective states. 146
The effect of this deference may accord lower courts powers beyond that
which Casey desires them to have. But as a practical matter, the Court
cannot rule on every issue that could come before it.
E. Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements
The joint opinion held all but one recordkeeping and reporting require-
ment of the Pennsylvania statute to be constitutional, based on a state's
interest in maternal health. 47 It cannot be questioned that the science of
medicine is continually reaching new breakthroughs, allowing all of us to
achieve better lifestyles and longer lifespans. Recordkeeping requirements
designed to further these ends have never been questioned by the Court. 48
The joint opinion held Section 3214(a)(12) unconstitutional.' 49 This
section is related to the spousal notification provision (Section 3209) and
required a woman to state her "reason for failure to provide notice"' 50 to
her husband if Section 3209 was violated. The joint opinion invalidated
Section 3214(a)(12) because it amounted to an undue burden. Since the
144. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
145. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2822 (1992) (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)).
146. Id. (citation omitted).
147. See supra notes 14, 85-86 and accompanying text.
148. Cf Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
765-67 (1986), overruled in part, Casey, 505 U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (reporting requirements
invalidated due to the scope of information required and its availability to the public).
149. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
150. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(a)(12) (1990).
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joint opinion held the husband notification provision to be an undue burden
and thereby unconstitutional, it would appear that analyzing Section
3214(a)(12) in terms of the "undue burden" standard is wholly irrelevant.
In effect, the validity of the reporting requirement is not severable from the
spousal notification provision and should have been invalidated for that rea-
son alone. 151
V. CONCLUSION
Abortion remains a hotly divided, political, religious, and moral issue in
America. It is not an issue that lends itself to an easy solution, or any
solution at all. The division over the issue is most evident when reading the
opinions of nine of the brightest legal and constitutional scholars our soci-
ety has to offer. We cannot expect the Court to embrace every competing
view over such a sharply divided issue. What we should expect from the
Court, however, is a constitutional decision regarding a woman's right to
obtain an abortion that is not subject to legal, political, religious, or moral
influences.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,152 the Court was presented with an
opportunity to clarify its position on abortion and aid lower courts in their
decisions.' 53 What emerged was a plurality opinion that enunciated a com-
pletely new standard as controlling law for invalidating abortion regula-
tions. The full effect and interpretation of Casey has yet to be realized.
However, one immediate effect of Casey and its "undue burden" standard is
151. Pennsylvania law provided a severability clause as follows:
The provisions of this Act are severable. If any word, phrase or provision of this Act or its
application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect any
other word, phrase or provision or application of this Act which can be given effect with-
out the invalid word, phrase, provision or application.
1989 Pa. Laws 592, 603, § 6. Since the spousal notification provision was held unconstitutional,
there appears to be no rational reason for Section 3214(a)(12)'s requirement that women seeking
abortions must state their reasons for failing to provide notice to their husbands of their inten-
tions. A severability provision will not supply a rational reason for allowing Section 3214(a)(12)
to remain in effect.
152. 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
153. Less than three months after Casey was decided, the first federal appellate decision ap-
plying the "undue burden" test was handed down. In Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th
Cir. 1992), a Louisiana abortion statute made it a crime to "administer ... or prescrib[e] any
drug, potion, medicine, or any other substance to a female" or to "us[e] any instrumental or
external force whatsoever on a female.., with the specific intent of terminating a pregnancy." Id.
at 29 (citation omitted). The statute did provide certain exceptions when the mother's or unborn
child's life was in danger and in pregnancies resulting from rape or incest. In a succinct opinion,
the court held the statute plainly unconstitutional on its face, utilizing the "undue burden" test.
The court noted that under Casey, a state's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibi-
tion of abortion before viability. Id. at 30.
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clear; it has continued the slow erosion of the principles of Roe v. Wade. 154
With the complete overturning of Roe as close as the vote of one Justice,
society must brace itself for the final ruling that may forever leave Roe a
relic in time and history.
JON D. ANDERSON
154. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), aff'd in part, overruled in part, Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at
2818.
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